Abstract. We describe a security-preserving construction of a random permutation of domain size N from a random function, the construction tolerating adversaries asking all N plaintexts, yet employing just Θ(lg N ) calls, on average, to the one-bit-output random function. The approach is based on card shuffling. The basic idea is to use the sometimes-recurse transformation: lightly shuffle the deck (with some other shuffle), cut the deck, and then recursively shuffle one of the two halves. Our work builds on a recent paper of Ristenpart and Yilek.
Introduction
Format-preserving encryption. Suppose you are given a blockcipher, say AES, and want to use it to efficiently construct a cipher on a smaller domain, say the set of N = 10 16 sixteen-digit credit card numbers. You could, for example, use AES as the round function for several rounds of a Feistel network, the approach taken by emerging standards [1, 6] . But information-theoretic security will vanish by the time the adversary asks √ N queries, which is a problem on these small-sized domains. 3 Or you could precompute a random permutation on N points, but spending Ω(N ) time in computation will become undesirable before √ N adversarial queries becomes infeasible. This paper provides a new solution to this problem of format-preserving encryption, where we aim to build ciphers with an arbitrary finite domain [3] [4] [5] 7] , frequently [N ] = {0, 1, . . . , N −1} for some N . Our solution lets you encipher a sixteen-digit credit card with about 1000 expected AES calls, 4 getting an essentially ideal provable-security claim. In particular, the adversary can ask any number of queries-including all N of them-and its advantage in distinguishing the constructed cipher from a random permutation will be insignificantly more than its ability to break the underlying primitive (in our example, AES) with a like number of queries.
Cast in more general language, then, this paper is about constructing ciphers (information theoretic or complexity theoretic PRPs) on an arbitrary domain [N ] , starting with a PRF. 5 As in other recent work [8, 10, 13] , our ideas are motivated by card shuffling and its cryptographic interpretation. This connection was observed by Naor [14, p. 62] , [16, p. 17] , who explained that when a card shuffle is oblivious-when you can trace the trajectory of a card without attending to the trajectories of other cards in the deck-then it may be useful as a cipher. We will move back and forth between the language of encryption and that of card shuffling: a PRP/cipher is a shuffle; a plaintext x encrypts to ciphertext y if the card initially at position x ends up at position y; the PRP's key is the randomness underlying the shuffle.
Ristenpart and Yilek paper. Our work follows on the heels of an upcoming Crypto paper [15] by Tom Ristenpart and Scott Yilek. That paper describes the following approach for turning one card shuffle into another. Assume that we want to shuffle N = 2 n cards. Then the Icicle construction first mixes the cards using some given (we'll call it the inner ) shuffle. Then we cut the deck into two piles and recursively shuffle each. Ristenpart and Yilek explain that if the inner shuffle is a good pseudorandom separator (PRS), then the constructed shuffle mixes all N cards well, a condition they term full security. A shuffle is a good PRS (a 2-PRS in the original terminology) if, after shuffling, the (unordered) set of cards ending up in each of the two piles is indistinguishable from a uniform partitioning of the cards into two equal-sized sets. 6 Ristenpart and Yilek apply the Icicle construction to the swap-or-not shuffle 7 of Hoang, Morris, and Rogaway [10] , a combination they call mix-and-cut. 8 The shuffle achieves full security in Θ(lg 2 N ) rounds. Replacing the random function of swap-or-not with a single-bit-output PRF, say AES, one gets a cipher on N points achieving full security with Θ(lg 2 N ) AES calls. 9, 10 While full security is directly achieved by some other oblivious shuffles [8, 9, 12] , mix-and-cut would seem to be faster.
Contributions.
We begin by reconceptualizing what is going on in mix-and-cut. Instead of thinking of the underlying transformation as turning a PRS into a PRP, we think of it as turning a mediocre PRP into a better one. If the inner shuffle is good enough to mix half the cards-in the inverse shuffle, any N/2 cards end up in almost uniform positions-then the constructed shuffle will achieve full security. After this shift in viewpoint, we make a simple change to mix-and-cut that dramatically improves its expected running time. As before, one begins by applying the inner shuffle to the N cards. Then one splits the deck and recursively shuffles one (rather than both) of the two halves. Using swapor-not (SN) for the inner shuffle we now get a PRP over [N ] enjoying full security and computable in Θ(lg N ) expected time. 11 We call the SN-based construction SR, for sometimes recurse. The underlying transformation we call SR. 6 Said differently, the first bit of a PRS on {0, 1} n should be indistinguishable from a random regular function from {0, 1} n to {0, 1}. 7 In the binary-string setting (N = 2 n ), a round of swap-or-not is: for a random string Ki ∈ {0, 1} n , replace X by Ki ⊕ X iff F (i,X) = 1, where F is a random function to bits andX = max(X, X ⊕ Ki). The final value of input X is its image after shuffling. For an arbitrary domain [N ], a round is: replace X by Ki − X iff F (i,X) = 1, wherê X = max(X, Ki − X). Subtraction is in a group of size N , say ZN , and Ki is selected uniformly from this group. 8 We will use the name mix-and-cut somewhat more generically, as both the name for the SN-based construction and as the transformation that essentially is with Icicle, but which differently conceptualizes the requirements on the inner shuffle. 9 Time bounds in this paragraph ignore dependency on the error bound, ε, which measures how close the constructed object is to a uniform permutation. The bounds apply for any constant ε. 10 In speaking of time we assume a model of computation with unit-time evaluation of the underlying PRF. This is realistic in the setting of "small domain" FPE, where each PRF is likely to be instantiated with a blockcipher call. 11 The expectation is over the input. In the case of binary-string inputs, slow-to-compute plaintexts, under our conventions, will be those whose ciphertexts begin with many leading 0-bits.
Our definitions and results apply to arbitrary N (it need not be a power of two). We emphasize that the adversary may query all points in the domain. We give numerical examples to illustrate that the improvement over mix-and-cut is large. We also explain why, with SR, having the running time depend on the key and plaintext does not give rise to side-channel attacks. Finally, we explain how to cheaply tweak [11] the construction, degrading neither the run-time nor the security bound compared to the untweaked counterpart. 12 Additional related work. The work of Ristenpart and Yilek [15] built on earlier work of Granboulan and Pornin [8] . The latter contains a shuffle that can now be seen as the application of the Icicle construction to a particular PRS. But the chosen PRS is expensive to realize, involving extensive use of arbitrary-precision floating-point arithmetic to do approximate sampling from a hypergeometric distribution. Both mix-and-cut and sometimes-recurse are far more practical.
For realistic domain sizes N , both mix-and-cut and sometimes-recurse are also much faster than the method of Stefanov and Shi [17] , which spendsΘ(N ) time to preprocess the key into a table of sizeΘ( √ N ) that supportsΘ( √ N )-time evaluation of the constructed cipher.
Mix-and-Cut Shuffle
This section reviews and reframes the prior work of Ristenpart and Yilek [15] ; the new contents of our paper begins in Section 3.
The mix-and-cut transformation can be described recursively as follows. Assume we want to shuffle N = 2 n cards. If N = 1 then we are done; a single card is already shuffled. Otherwise, to mix-and-cut shuffle N ≥ 2 cards, 1. shuffle the N cards using some other, inner shuffle; and then 2. cut the deck into two halves and, recursively, shuffle each half.
The method can be seen as an operator, MC, that maps a shuffle SH on a power-of-two cards to a shuffle SH = MC[SH] on the same number of cards. A sufficient condition for SH to achieve full security is for SH to lightly shuffle the deck. Informally, to lightly shuffle the deck means that if one identifies some N/2 positions of the deck, then the cards that land in these positions should be nearly uniform. More formally, we say that SH ε-lightly shuffles if SH −1 sends any N/2 cards to something within total-variation distance ε of N/2 uniformly random but distinct positions. Note that if the shuffle SH is swap-or-not (SN) then it is equivalent to ask that SH itself send N/2 cards to something ε-close to inform, as SN is identical in its forward and backward direction, up to the naming of keys.
Let's consider the speed of MC with SN as the underlying shuffle, a combination we'll write as MC = MC[SN]. First some preliminaries. For a round-parameterized shuffle SH that approaches the uniform distribution, let τ r q (N ) be the induced distribution after r rounds on some q distinct cards (x 1 , . . . , x q ) ∈ Z q N from a deck of size N , and let π q (N ) be the uniform distribution on q distinct points from [N ] . Let Δ SH (N, q, r) = τ r q (N ) − π q (N ) be the statistical distance between these two distributions. Hoang, Morris, and Rogaway show that, for the swap-or-not shuffle, SN,
12 Ristenpart and Yilek likewise support tweaks [15] , but their quantitative bounds give up more, and each round key needs to depend on the tweak. Our improvements in this direction apply just as well to mix-and-cut.
Assuming even N , setting q = N/2 in this equation gives
and so
For a round-based shuffle SH monotonically approaching the uniform distribution, let T SH (N, q, ε) be the minimum number r such that
be the time to mix all the cards to within ε. For MC = MC[SN] to mix all N = 2 n cards to within ε it will suffice if we arrange that each invocation of SN mixes half the cards to within ε/n. Assuming this strategy, the total number of needed rounds will be
Interpreting, the MC construction can encipher n-bit strings, getting to within any fixed statistical distance ε of uniform, by using Θ(n) stages of Θ(n) rounds, so Θ(n 2 ) total rounds. The round functions here are assumed uniform and independent. Replacing them by a complexity-theoretic PRF, we are converting a PRF into a PRP on domain {0, 1} n with Θ(n 2 ) calls, achieving tight provable security and no limit on the number of adversarial queries.
Sometimes-Recurse Shuffle
Our main observation is this: after lightly shuffling the deck and cutting it in half, there is no need to recurse on one of the two halves; either pile can be declared finished, recursing only on the other. The reason is that once N/2 of the cards are distributed to within ε of uniform, so too is the joint distribution of this half of the cards and the unordered set of remaining cards. If the latter set of cards is shuffled to within δ of uniform then the entire sequence of N cards will be shuffled to within ε + δ of uniform. Shuffling the unfinished set of cards by starting at whatever configuration they were left in will do no harm, as we will shuffle the cards to within distance δ of uniform starting from any initial ordering.
Power-of-two domains. The sometimes-recurse (SR) transform can thus be described as follows. Assume for now that want to shuffle N = 2 n cards (we will generalize afterward). If N = 1 then we are done; a single card is already shuffled. Otherwise, to SR shuffle N ≥ 2 cards, 1. shuffle the N cards using some other, inner shuffle; and then 2. cut the deck into two halves and, recursively, shuffle the first half. 13 The method can be seen as an operator, SR, that maps a shuffle SH on any power-of-two cards to a shuffle SH = SR[SH] on any power-of-two cards.
Recasting the method into more cryptographic language, we are given a (variable-input-length)
The SR transformation. The description above assumes a power-of-two number of cards and an even cut of the deck. The first assumption runs contrary to our intended applications, and dropping this assumption necessitates dropping the second assumption as well. Here then is the SR transform stated more broadly. Assume an inner shuffle, SH, that can mix an arbitrary number of cards. Let p : N → N, the split, be a function with 1 ≤ p(N ) < N. We'll write p N for p(N ). We construct a shuffle SH = SR p [SH] . Namely, if N = 1, we are done; a single card is shuffled. Otherwise, 1. shuffle the N cards using the inner shuffle, SH; and then 2. cut the deck into a first pile having p N cards and a second pile having q N = N − p N cards.
Recursively, shuffle the first pile. 
The proof is just the repeated application of the observation in the paragraph that began Section 3. Using SN as the inner shuffle. We'll write SR (no bold) for SR[SN], the sometimes-recurse transformation applied to the swap-or-not shuffle. The algorithm is shown in Fig. 1 , now written out in the manner of a cipher, where the trajectory of a single card X is followed. Of course SN = SN t depends on the round count and SR = SR p depends on the split, so SR = SR t,p depends on both. The canonical choice for the split p N is p N = N/2 ; when no mention of p N is made, this is assumed. There is no default for the round counts t N ; we must select these values with care.
We proceed to analyze SR, for the canonical split, with the help of Proposition 1 and equation (2). We aim to shuffle N cards to within a target statistical distance ε. Assume we run each stage (that is, each SN shuffle) with t N adequate to achieve error ε/n for any half, rounded up, of the cards. When N is a power of 2, the expected total number of rounds to encipher a point will then be The worst-case number of rounds is similarly bounded. We summarize the result as follows. As a numerical example, equation (3) gives E[T SR (10 16 , 10 −10 )] ≤ 1159. In the next section we will do better than this-but not by much-by doing calculations directly from equation (1) and by partitioning the error ε so as to give a larger portion to earlier (that is, larger) generated N . 
Parameter Optimization
Round counts. Let us continue to assume the canonical split of p N = N/2 and look at the optimization of round counts t N under this assumption.
In speaking below of the number p of nontrivial stages of SR, we only count generated N -values with N ≥ 3. This is because we will always select t 2 = 1, as this choice already contributes zero error, and the degenerate SR stage with N = 1 contributes no error and needs no t 1 value (let t 1 = 0). Corresponding to this convention for counting the number of nontrivial stages, we let The table of Fig. 2 illustrates the expected and worst-case number of rounds that result from these two strategies if we encipher on a domain of N 0 = 10 d points and cap the error at ε = 10 −10 . The pronounced differences between mean and max round counts (a factor exceeding 17 when n = 16) coincides with the saving of SR over MC. In contrast, there is only a modest difference in mean round-counts between the two round-count selection strategies.
In numerical experiments, more complex strategies for determining the round counts did not work better.
Non-equal splits. Besides the split of p N = N/2 , we considered splits of p N = αN for α ∈ (0, 1). For example, if the input is a decimal string then a selection of α = 0.1 corresponds to using SN until a 90% fraction of the cards are (almost) properly distributed, at which point there would be only a 10% chance of needing to recurse. When a recursive call is made, it would be on a string of length one less than before. But splits this uneven turn out to be inefficient; see Fig. 3 . On the other hand, when the split p N = αN has α close to 1/2, the expected number of rounds is not very sensitive to α; again see the figure. Small α make each SN stage slower, but there will be fewer of them; large α make each SN stage faster, but there will be more.
Given the similar mean round counts for strategies 1 and 2, the similar mean round counts all α near 1/2, the implementation simplicity of dividing by 2, and the better maximum rounds counts of strategy 1, the choice of strategy 1 and α = 1/2 seems best.
Incorporating Tweaks
The possibly-small domain for FPE makes it important, in applications, to have the constructed cipher be tweaked : an additional argument T , the tweak, names the desired permutation in a family of keyed permutations [11] . In the reference experiment that defines security one asks for indistinguishability (complexity theoretic or information theoretic) from a family of tweak-indexed, uniformly random permutations, each tweak naming an independent permutation from the collection. As an example of a tweak's use, in the context of enciphering a credit card number, one might encipher only the middle six digits, using the first six and last four digits as the tweak.
The obvious way to incorporate a tweak in SR is to make the round constants K i (line 21 of Fig. 1 ) depend on it, and to make the round functions F (i,X) (line 23 of Fig. 1 ) depend on it. Note, however, that an inefficiency emerges when the former is done: if there is a large space of possible tweaks, it will no longer be possible to precompute the round constants K i . In addition, we do not want to get a security bound that gives up a factor corresponding to the number of tweaks used, which would be a potentially major loss in quantitative security.
As it turns out, neither price need be paid. In particular, it is fine to leave the round constants independent of the tweak T , and, even when doing so, there need be no quantitative security loss in the bound from making this change. What we call tweaked-SR, then, is identical to Fig. 1 except that the tweak T is added to the scope of F at line 23.
To establish security for this scheme, obtaining the same bounds as before, we go back to the swap-or-not shuffle and show that, in that context, if the round constants are left untweaked but the round function is tweaked, then equation (1) continues to hold. The result is as follows. In its statement and proof, for μ and ν probability distributions on Ω, denote the total variation distance between them by μ − ν = (1/2) x∈Ω |μ(x) − ν(x)|. Fix q 1 , . . . , q l with 
Theorem 3.
Proof. Let
from which (4) follows by way of
. 
We claim that
For distributions μ and ν the total variation distance μ − ν is half the L 1 -norm of μ − ν. Since the L 1 -norm is convex, to verify the claim it is enough to show that
But the X i r are conditionally independent given K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K r , so
Thus it remains to show that
but this is exactly what is shown in [10, fourth-to-last equation of p. 8]. This verifies (6) . Combining this with (5) gives
where the second inequality holds because the summands in the definition of Δ(j) are increasing. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3 plays the same role in establishing the security for tweaked-SR as equation (1) played for establishing the security of the basic version. The values in the table of Fig. 2 , for example, apply equally well to the tweakable-SR. We comment that in the the tweakable version of SR, the round constants do depend on the generated N -values. This dependency can also be eliminated, but we do not pursue this for now.
Absence of Timing Attacks
With SR (and, more generally, with SR), the total number of rounds t * used to encipher a plaintext X ∈ [N 0 ] to a ciphertext Y ∈ [N 0 ] will depend on X and the key K = KF . This suggests that an adversary's acquiring t * , perhaps by measuring the running time of the algorithm, could be damaging. But this is not the case, for the adversary knows Y , and t * depends only on it.
It is easiest to describe this dependency when N 0 = 2 n is a power of two. In that case the generated N -values are 2 n , 2 n−1 , . . . , 4, 2, 1. Let t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n−2 , t n−1 , t n be the corresponding round counts (the last two values are 1 and 0, respectively). Let t * j = i≤j t i be the cumulative round counts: the total number of SN rounds if we run for j + 1 stages. Then t * is simply t * where is the number of leading 0-bits in the n-bit binary representation of Y . The adversary holding a ciphertext of Y = 0 z 1Z, knows that it was produced using t * = t * z rounds of SN. Ciphertext 0 n is the slowest to produce, needing t * n rounds. The observation generalizes when N 0 is not a power of 2: the set [N 0 ] is partitioned into easilycalculated intervals and the number of SN rounds that a ciphertext Y was subjected to is determined by the interval containing it.
Discussion
Alternative description. It is easy to eliminate the tail recursion of Fig. 1 ; no stack is needed. This and other changes are made to the alternative description of tweaked-SR given in Fig. 4 . While the algorithm looks rather different from before, it is equivalent.
Which pile to recurse on? The convention that SR recurses on the first (left) pile of cards, rather than on the second (right) pile of cards, simplifies bookkeeping: in this way, we will always be following a card X ∈ [N ] for decreasing values of N . Had we recursed on the second pile we 50 procedure E
